It's for the introduction of njs support.
For each option that supports native variable and JS template literals introduced next,
it's unified as template string.
No functional changes.
This makes the replacement of forwarded request header
like client_ip and protocol more generic.
It's a prerequirement for protocol replacement.
No functional changes.
This commit introduces the replacement of the client address based on the value
of a specified HTTP header. This is intended for use when Unit is placed
behind a reverse proxy like nginx or a CDN.
You must specify the source addresses of the trusted proxies. This can be
accomplished with any valid IP pattern supported by Unit's match block:
["10.0.0.1", "10.4.0.0/16", "!192.168.1.1"]
The feature is configured per listener.
The client address replacement functionality only operates when there is a
source IP match and the specified header is present. Typically this would be
an 'X-Forwarded-For' header.
{
"listeners": {
"127.0.0.1:8080": {
"client_ip": {
"header": "X-Forwarded-For",
"source": [
"10.0.0.0/8"
]
},
"pass": "applications/my_app"
},
}
}
If a request occurs and Unit receives a header like below:
"X-Forwarded-For: 84.123.23.23"
By default, Unit trusts the last rightmost IP in the header, so REMOTE_ADDR
will be set to 84.123.23.23 if the connection originated from 10.0.0.0/8.
If Unit runs behind consecutive reverse proxies and receives a header similar
to the following:
"X-Forwarded-For: 84.123.23.23, 10.0.0.254"
You will need to enable "recursive" checking, which walks the header from
last address to first and chooses the first non-trusted address it finds.
{
"listeners": {
"127.0.0.1:8080": {
"client_ip": {
"header": "X-Forwarded-For",
"source": [
"10.0.0.0/8"
]
"recursive": true,
},
"pass": "applications/my_app"
},
}
}
If a connection from 10.0.0.0/8 occurs, the chain is walked. Here, 10.0.0.254
is also a trusted address so the client address will be replaced with
84.123.23.23.
If all IP addresses in the header are trusted, the client address is set to
the first address in the header:
If 10.0.0.0/8 is trusted and "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.1",
the client address will be replaced with 10.0.0.3.
When processing a restart request, the router sends a QUIT message to all
existing processes of the application. Then, a new shared application port is
created to ensure that new requests won't be handled by the old processes of
the application.
Listen socket is actually closed in the instant timer handler. This patch moves
the "configuration has been applied" notification to the timer handler to avoid
a situation when the user gets the response from the controller, but the listen
socket is still open in the router.
Previously, all requests that contained in header field names characters other
than alphanumeric, or "-", or "_" were rejected with a 400 "Bad Request" error
response.
Now, the parser allows the same set of characters as specified in RFC 7230,
including: "!", "#", "$", "%", "&", "'", "*", "+", ".", "^", "`", "|", and "~".
Header field names that contain only these characters are considered valid.
Also, there's a new option introduced: "discard_unsafe_fields". It accepts
boolean value and it is set to "true" by default.
When this option is "true", all header field names that contain characters
in valid range, but other than alphanumeric or "-" are skipped during parsing.
When the option is "false", these header fields aren't skipped.
Requests with non-valid characters in header field names according to
RFC 7230 are rejected regardless of "discard_unsafe_fields" setting.
This closes#422 issue on GitHub.
It's not used since cbcd76704c90.
This option is a leftover from previous IPC between router and applications
processes. It was never documented, though.
Thanks to 洪志道 (Hong Zhi Dao).
This is the port shared between all application processes which use it to pass
requests for processing. Using it significantly simplifies the request
processing code in the router. The drawback is 2 more file descriptors per each
configured application and more complex libunit message wait/read code.
The lifespan of a listening socket is longer than both router
configuration's and temporary router configuration's lifespan,
so the sockets should be stored in persistent queues. Safety
is ensured by the fact that the router processes only one new
configuration at any time.
For accurate app descriptor release, it is required to count the number of
use counts. Use count increased when:
- app linked to configuration app queue;
- socket conf stores pointer to app;
- request for start app process posted to router service thread;
Application port has pointer to app, but it does not increase use count
to avoid use count loop.
Timer needs a pointer to nxt_timer_t which is stored in engine timers tree.
nxt_timer_t now resides in nxt_app_joint_t and does not lock the application.
Start process port RPC handlers is also linked to nxt_app_joint_t.
App joint (nxt_app_joint_t) is a 'weak pointer':
- single threaded;
- use countable;
- store pointer to nxt_app_t (which can be NULL);
nxt_app_t has pointer to nxt_app_joint_t and update its pointer to app.
- Pre-fork 'processes.spare' application processes;
- fork more processes to keep 'processes.spare' idle processes;
- fork on-demand up to 'processes.max' count;
- scale down idle application processes above 'processes.spare' after
'processes.idle_timeout';
- number of concurrently started application processes also limited by
'processes.spare' (or 1, if spare is 0).
New optional configuration parameter introduced: limits.reschedule_timeout.
Default value 1 second. In the case when request is written to the port
socket 'in advance', it is called 'pending'.
On every completed request, the head of pending request is checked against
reschedule timeout. If this request waiting for execution longer than
timeout, it is cancelled, new port selected for this request.
Use counter helps to simplify logic around port and application free.
Port 'post' function introduced to simplify post execution of particular
function to original port engine's thread.
Write message queue is protected by mutex which makes port write operation
thread safe.
The router process exited abnormally on reconfiguration if number
of worker threads had been decreased on the previous reconfiguration.
Besides the list of router engines should be updated only after a new
configuration joints have been prepared for all engines.
