We allocate 'job' we then have a check if it's not NULL and do stuff
with it, but then we accessed it outside this check.
Simply return if job is NULL.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
This was reported by the 'Clang Static Analyzer' as a 'dead nested
assignment'.
We set end outside the loop but the first time we use it is to assign it
in the loop (not used anywhere else).
Further cleanup could be to reduce the scope of end by moving its
declaration inside the loop.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
This makes the build tree more organized, which is good for adding new
stuff. Now, it's useful for example for adding manual pages in man3/,
but it may be useful in the future for example for extending the build
system to run linters (e.g., clang-tidy(1), Clang analyzer, ...) on the
C source code.
Previously, the build tree was quite flat, and looked like this (after
`./configure && make`):
$ tree -I src build
build
├── Makefile
├── autoconf.data
├── autoconf.err
├── echo
├── libnxt.a
├── nxt_auto_config.h
├── nxt_version.h
├── unitd
└── unitd.8
1 directory, 9 files
And after this patch, it looks like this:
$ tree -I src build
build
├── Makefile
├── autoconf.data
├── autoconf.err
├── bin
│ └── echo
├── include
│ ├── nxt_auto_config.h
│ └── nxt_version.h
├── lib
│ ├── libnxt.a
│ └── unit
│ └── modules
├── sbin
│ └── unitd
├── share
│ └── man
│ └── man8
│ └── unitd.8
└── var
├── lib
│ └── unit
├── log
│ └── unit
└── run
└── unit
17 directories, 9 files
It also solves one issue introduced in
5a37171f73 ("Added default values for pathnames."). Before that
commit, it was possible to run unitd from the build system
(`./build/unitd`). Now, since it expects files in a very specific
location, that has been broken. By having a directory structure that
mirrors the installation, it's possible to trick it to believe it's
installed, and run it from there:
$ ./configure --prefix=./build
$ make
$ ./build/sbin/unitd
Fixes: 5a37171f73 ("Added default values for pathnames.")
Reported-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Pavlov <thresh@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com>
Cc: Zhidao Hong <z.hong@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
In BSD systems, it's usually </var/db> or some other dir under </var>
that is not </var/lib>, so $statedir is a more generic name. See
hier(7).
Reported-by: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com>
Reported-by: Zhidao Hong <z.hong@f5.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Pavlov <thresh@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Cc: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
We install jars with names like websocket-api-${NXT_JAVA_MODULE}-$NXT_VERSION.jar,
which translates to versioned NXT_JAVA_MODULE in the packaging system, e.g.
websocket-api-java11-1.30.0.jar.
- Configuration: added "/config/settings/http/log_route".
Type: bool
Default: false
This adds configurability to the error log. It allows enabling and
disabling logs related to how the router performs selection of the
routes.
- HTTP: logging request line.
Log level: [notice]
The request line is essential to understand which logs correspond to
which request when reading the logs.
- HTTP: logging route that's been discarded.
Log level: [info]
- HTTP: logging route whose action is selected.
Log level: [notice]
- HTTP: logging when "fallback" action is taken.
Log level: [notice]
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/758>
Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/pull/824>
Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/pull/839>
Suggested-by: Timo Stark <t.stark@nginx.com>
Suggested-by: Mark L Wood-Patrick <mwoodpatrick@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Tested-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Acked-by: Artem Konev <a.konev@f5.com>
Cc: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhidao Hong <z.hong@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
This prctl(2) option was enabled in commit 0277d8f1 ("Isolation: Fix the
enablement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.") and this was being set by default.
This prctl(2) when enabled renders (amongst other things) the set-UID
and set-GID bits on executables ineffective after an execve(2).
This causes an issue for applications that want to execute the
sendmail(8) binary, this includes the PHP mail() function, which is
usually set-GID.
After some internal discussion it was decided to disable this option by
default.
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/852>
Fixes: 0277d8f1 ("Isolation: Fix the enablement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.")
Fixes: e2b53e16 ("Added "rootfs" feature.")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
When starting unit, if its Unix domain control socket was already active
you would get an error message like
2023/03/15 18:07:55 [alert] 53875#8669650 connect(5, unix:/tmp/control.sock) succeed, address already in use
which is confusing in a couple of regards, firstly we have the classic
success/failure message and secondly 'address already in use' is an
actual errno value, EADDRINUSE and we didn't get an error from this
connect(2).
Re-word this error message for greater clarity.
Reported-by: Liam Crilly <liam.crilly@nginx.com>
Cc: Liam Crilly <liam.crilly@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Currently when using Unix domain sockets for requests, if unit is
reconfigured then it will fail if it tries to bind(2) again to a Unix
domain socket with something like
2023/02/25 19:15:50 [alert] 35274#35274 bind(\"unix:/tmp/unit.sock\") failed (98: Address already in use)
When closing such a socket we really need to unlink(2) it. However that
presents a problem in that when running as root, while the main process
runs as root and creates the socket, it's the router process, that runs
as an unprivileged user, e.g nobody, that closes the socket and would
thus remove it, but couldn't due to not having permission, even if the
socket is mode 0666, you need write permissions on the containing
directory to remove a file.
There are several options to solve this, all with varying degrees of
complexity and utility.
1) Give the user who the router process runs as write permission to
the directory containing the listen sockets. These can then be
unlink(2)'d from the router process.
Simple and would work, but perhaps not the most elegant.
2) Using capabilities(7). The router process could temporarily attain
the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability, unlink(7) the socket, then
relinquish the capability until required again.
These are Linux specific (other systems may have similar mechanisms
which would be extra work to support). There is also a, albeit
small, window where the router process is running with elevated
privileges.
3) Have the main process do the unlink(2), it is after all the process
that created the socket.
This is what this commit implements.
We create a new port IPC message type of NXT_PORT_MSG_SOCKET_UNLINK,
that is used by the router process to notify the main process about a
Unix domain socket to unlink(2).
Upon doing a reconfigure the router process will call
nxt_router_listen_socket_release() which will close the socket, we
extend this function in the case of non-abstract Unix domain sockets, so
that it will send a message to the main process containing a copy of the
nxt_sockaddr_t structure that will contain the filename of the socket.
In the main process the handler that we have defined,
nxt_main_port_socket_unlink_handler(), for this message type will run
and allow us to look for the socket in question in the listen_sockets
array and remove it and unlink(2) the socket.
This then allows the reconfigure to work if it tries to bind(2) again to
a socket that previously existed.
Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/669>
Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/pull/735>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
In nxt_process_quit() there is a loop that iterates over the
task->thread->runtime->listen_sockets array and closes the connections.
This code has been there from the beginning
$ git log --pretty=oneline -S'if (rt->listen_sockets != NULL)'
e9e5ddd5a5 Refactor of process management.
6f2c9acd18 Processes refactoring. The cycle has been renamed to the runtime.
$ git log --pretty=oneline -S'if (cycle->listen_sockets != NULL) {'
6f2c9acd18 Processes refactoring. The cycle has been renamed to the runtime.
16cbf3c076 Initial version.
but never seems to have been used (AFAICT and certainly not recently,
confirmed by code inspection and running pytests with a bunch of
language modules enabled and the code in question was never executed) as
the listen_sockets array has never been populated... until now.
The previous commit now adds Unix domain sockets to this array so that
they can be unlink(2)'d upon exit and reconfiguration.
This has now caused this dormant code to become active as it now tries
to close these sockets (from at least the prototype processes), this
array is inherited via fork by other processes.
The file descriptor for these sockets is set to -1 when they are put
into this array. This then results in close(-1) calls which caused
multiple failures in the pytests such as
> assert not alerts, 'alert(s)'
E AssertionError: alert(s)
E assert not ['2023/03/09 23:26:14 [alert] 137673#137673 socket close(-1) failed (9: Bad file descriptor)']
I think the simplest thing is to just remove this code.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
If we don't remove the Unix domain listen socket file then when Unit
restarts it get an error like
2023/02/25 23:10:11 [alert] 36388#36388 bind(\"unix:/tmp/unit.sock\") failed (98: Address already in use)
This patch makes use of the listen_sockets array, that is already
allocated in the main process but never populated, to place the Unix
domain listen sockets into.
At shutdown we can then loop through this array and unlink(2) any Unix
domain sockets found therein.
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/792>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
In nxt_router_prepare_msg() we create a buffer (nxt_unit_request_t *req)
that gets sent to an application process that contains details about a
client request.
This buffer was always a little larger than needed due to allocating space
for the remote address _and_ port and the local address _and_ port. We
also allocate space for the local port separately.
->{local,remote}->length includes the port number and ':' and also the
'[]' for IPv6. E.g [2001:db8::1]:8080
->{local,remote}->address_length represents the length of the unadorned
IP address. E.g 2001:db8::1
Update the buffer size so that we only allocate what is actually needed.
Suggested-by: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com>
Cc: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
User @bes-internal reported a Perl module crasher on GitHub.
This was due to a Perl application sending back two responses, for each
response we would call down into XS_NGINX__Unit__Sandbox_cb(), the first
time pctx->req would point to a valid nxt_unit_request_info_t, the
second time pctx->req would be NULL.
Add an invalid responses check which covers this case.
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/841>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
This fixes an issue reported by @Peter2121 on GitHub.
In nxt_router_prepare_msg() we create a buffer (nxt_unit_request_t *req)
that gets sent to an application process that contains details about a
client request.
The req structure comprises various members with the final member being
an array (specified as a flexible array member, with its actual length
denoted by the req->fields_count member) of nxt_unit_field_t's. These
structures specify the length and offset for the various request headers
name/value pairs which are stored after some request metadata that is
stored immediately after this array of structs as individual nul
terminated strings.
After this we have the body content data (if any). So it looks a little
like
(gdb) x /64bs 0x7f38c976e060
0x7f38c976e060: "\353\346\244\t\006" <-- First nxt_unit_field_t
0x7f38c976e066: ""
0x7f38c976e067: ""
0x7f38c976e068: "T\001"
0x7f38c976e06b: ""
0x7f38c976e06c: "Z\001"
0x7f38c976e06f: ""
...
0x7f38c976e170: "\362#\244\v$" <-- Last nxt_unit_field_t
0x7f38c976e176: ""
0x7f38c976e177: ""
0x7f38c976e178: "\342\002"
0x7f38c976e17b: ""
0x7f38c976e17c: "\352\002"
0x7f38c976e17f: ""
0x7f38c976e180: "POST" <-- Start of request metadata
0x7f38c976e185: "HTTP/1.1"
0x7f38c976e18e: "unix:"
0x7f38c976e194: "unix:/dev/shm/842.sock"
0x7f38c976e1ab: ""
0x7f38c976e1ac: "fedora"
0x7f38c976e1b3: "/842.php"
0x7f38c976e1bc: "HTTP_HOST" <-- Start of header fields
0x7f38c976e1c6: "fedora"
0x7f38c976e1cd: "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO"
0x7f38c976e1e4: "https"
...
0x7f38c976e45a: "HTTP_COOKIE"
0x7f38c976e466: "PHPSESSID=8apkg25r9s9vju3pi085i21eh4"
0x7f38c976e48b: "public_form=sended" <-- Body content
Well that's how things are supposed to look! When using Unix domain
sockets what we actually got looked like
...
0x7f6141f3445a: "HTTP_COOKIE"
0x7f6141f34466: "PHPSESSID=uo5b2nu9buijkc89jotbgmd60vpublic_form=sended"
Here, the body content (from a POST for example) has been appended
straight onto the end of the last header field value. In this case
corrupting the PHP session cookie. The body content would still be
found by the application as its offset into this buffer is correct.
This problem was actually caused by a0327445 ("PHP: allowed to specify
URLs without a trailing '/'.") which added an extra item into this
request buffer specifying the port number that unit is listening on that
handled this request.
Unfortunately when I wrote that patch I didn't increase the size of this
request buffer to accommodate it.
When using normal TCP sockets we actually end up allocating more space
than required for this buffer, we track the end of this buffer up to
where the body content would go and so we have a few spare bytes between
the nul byte of the last field header value and the start of the body
content.
When using Unix domain sockets, they have no associated port number and
thus the port number has a length of 0 bytes, but we still write a '\0'
in there using up a byte that we didn't account for, this causes us to
loose the nul byte of the last header fields value causing the body data
to be appended to the last header field value.
The fix is simple, account for the local port length, we also add 1 to
it, this covers the nul byte, even if there is no port as with Unix
domain sockets.
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/842>
Fixes: a0327445 ("PHP: allowed to specify URLs without a trailing '/'.")
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
This adds the NGINX Code of Conduct file to the repo, one of the
community guides requested and tracked for community health by the NGINX
community and by GitHub insights.
[ Re-flowed the commit message - Andrew ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Now unitc obtains the path to the unitd binary from information
contained in the unitd: main process. If unitd was started with an
explicit path then that path will be used to obtain the default
control socket, instead of using the unitd binary in $PATH.
When running as a daemon. unit currently sets umask(0), i.e no umask.
This is resulting in various directories being created with a mode of
0777, e.g
rwxrwxrwx
this is currently affecting cgroup and rootfs directories, which are
being created with a mode of 0777, and when running as a daemon as there
is no umask to restrict the permissions.
This also affects the language modules (the umask is inherited over
fork(2)) whereby unless something explicitly sets a umask, files and
directories will be created with full permissions, 0666 (rw-rw-rw-)/
0777 (rwxrwxrwx) respectively.
This could be an unwitting security issue.
My original idea was to just remove the umask(0) call and thus inherit
the umask from the executing shell/program.
However there was some concern about just inheriting whatever umask was
in effect.
Alex suggested that rather than simply removing the umask(0) call we
change it to a value of 022 (which is a common default), which will
result in directories and files with permissions at most of 0755
(rwxr-xr-x) & 0644 (rw-r--r--).
If applications need some other umask set, they can (as they always have
been able to) set their own umask(2).
Suggested-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
When using the 'rootfs' isolation option, by default a tmpfs filesystem
is mounted on tmp/. Currently this is mounted with a mode of 0777, i.e
drwxrwxrwx. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:56 tmp
however this should really have the sticky bit[0] set (as is per-normal for
such directories) to prevent users from having free reign on the files
contained within.
What we really want is it mounted with a mode of 01777, i.e
drwxrwxrwt. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:57 tmp
[0]: To quote inode(7)
"The sticky bit (S_ISVTX) on a directory means that a file in that
directory can be renamed or deleted only by the owner of the file, by
the owner of the directory, and by a privileged process."
Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
When running as a daemon. unit currently sets umask(0), i.e no umask.
This is resulting in various directories being created with a mode of
0777, e.g
rwxrwxrwx
this is currently affecting cgroup and rootfs directories, which are
being created with a mode of 0777, and when running as a daemon as there
is no umask to restrict the permissions.
This also affects the language modules (the umask is inherited over
fork(2)) whereby unless something explicitly sets a umask, files and
directories will be created with full permissions, 0666 (rw-rw-rw-)/
0777 (rwxrwxrwx) respectively.
This could be an unwitting security issue.
My original idea was to just remove the umask(0) call and thus inherit
the umask from the executing shell/program.
However there was some concern about just inheriting whatever umask was
in effect.
Alex suggested that rather than simply removing the umask(0) call we
change it to a value of 022 (which is a common default), which will
result in directories and files with permissions at most of 0755
(rwxr-xr-x) & 0644 (rw-r--r--).
If applications need some other umask set, they can (as they always have
been able to) set their own umask(2).
Suggested-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
When using the 'rootfs' isolation option, by default a tmpfs filesystem
is mounted on tmp/. Currently this is mounted with a mode of 0777, i.e
drwxrwxrwx. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:56 tmp
however this should really have the sticky bit[0] set (as is per-normal for
such directories) to prevent users from having free reign on the files
contained within.
What we really want is it mounted with a mode of 01777, i.e
drwxrwxrwt. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:57 tmp
[0]: To quote inode(7)
"The sticky bit (S_ISVTX) on a directory means that a file in that
directory can be renamed or deleted only by the owner of the file, by
the owner of the directory, and by a privileged process."
Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Previously, it was necessary to support older versions of Python for
compatibility. F-strings were released in Python 3.6. Python 3.5 was
marked as unsupported by the end of 2020, so now it's possible to start
using f-strings safely for better readability and performance.
Especially in small trees, ASCII characters are confusing. Use nicer
UTF-8 characters, which are more readable to the audience of this
script. We don't expect the audience of this script to have limited
environments where these characters will not be shown, but if that
happens, we could improve the script to select the caracters based on
the locale.
Suggested-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Since the previous commit, nxt_getpid() is only ever aliased to
getpid(2).
nxt_getpid() was only used once in the code, while there are multiple
direct uses of getpid(2)
$ grep -r "getpid()" src/
src/nxt_unit.c: nxt_unit_pid = getpid();
src/nxt_process.c: nxt_pid = nxt_getpid();
src/nxt_process.c: nxt_pid = getpid();
src/nxt_lib.c: nxt_pid = getpid();
src/nxt_process.h:#define nxt_getpid() \
src/nxt_process.h:#define nxt_getpid() \
src/nxt_process.h: getpid()
Just remove it and convert the _single_ instance of nxt_getpid() to
getpid(2).
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
When using SYS_clone we used the getpid kernel system call directly via
syscall(SYS_getpid) to avoid issues with cached pids.
However since we are now only using fork(2) (+ unshare(2) for
namespaces) we no longer need to call the kernel getpid directly as the
fork(2) will ensure the cached pid is invalidated.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
